Man United vs Barcelona - Brief Preview

So much has already been said about this cup final, there's not a great deal more that I can add. Jonathan Wilson has written some great pieces (for the Guardian and Sports Illustrated) which discuss the potential benefits of a 3-man United defence - but he naturally concludes that Ferguson won't risk such a dramatic change in strategy, especially not one which requires him to break up his preferred centre-back pairing of Rio and Vidic (United have conceded just four goals in the competition this season! - although, Barcelona have scored 27...).

And Michael Cox has previewed the game excellently, as well as highlighting some important lessons from the previous final of 2009. He points out that one of Ferguson's biggest problems is that, with Darren Fletcher unfit, a midfield pairing of Ryan Giggs and Michael Carrick is nowhere near sturdy enough to deal with Barca's Busquets-Xavi-Iniesta(-Messi) central midfield. He also questions whether Chicharito ought to start for Man United - something which is likely to be Ferguson's most significant tactical decision.

And elsewhere, everyone's favourite Champions League-winning manager Rafael Benitez lent his name to a dazzling double-spread preview in The Times.

So I'll just offer my own humble prediction of how each side will line up, and, consequently, where the game might be won or lost.



Everyone knows more or less how Barcelona are likely to set up. With Abidal unfit, Mascherano will probably come into the defence and push Puyol out to left-back. The consensus on United, however, is that they will start in their usual 4-4-1-1 formation, which they have used for most 'big' games in the second half of the season, with Chicharito up front and Rooney just behind. However, I think this line-up makes more sense, and I think Ferguson will be tempted to use it.

It allows Park, the ultimate harrying 'defensive forward,' to close down Busquets, who, as Sid Lowe has pointed out, is absolutely integral to Barcelona's play. During (inevitable) periods of sustained Barca pressure, Park can drop deeper onto Xavi, allowing Giggs to pull wide and track Alves, while Rooney can drop onto Busquets. This allows Nani, one of United's shining stars this season, to stay permanently higher up the pitch, where, if the ball breaks quickly into the left-channel, he can be one-on-one with Mascherano who he can beat, or at least draw fouls and bookings from. It might also encourage Alves to stay deeper, which would severely hinder the fluency of Barcelona's attacking play. As such, Nani would become the only player without a serious pressing remit, but would be regularly afforded space wide, and would be able to isolate one of Barca's weakest links (as strange as that may sound when talking about Javier Mascherano - he is not a natural centre-back).

From a defensive point of view, of course it still relies on United's back-four remaining solid - retaining shape is absolutely vital, because Barca's players will wait and wait for their chance to capitalise on any players being dragged out of position. David Pleat wrote in the Guardian that Rio ought to be brave in stepping out of defence to track Messi, but Messi, playing as a false-nine, tends to drop into the centre-right position, which would mean Vidic would have more responsibility for him. If Vidic is left too exposed, though, and is constantly dragged out of position, he is liable to get in trouble with the referee.

Champions League Quarter Finals First Leg - Talking Points

Real Madrid 4 - 0 Tottenham Hotspur

My favourite quote of this week was this from Redknapp, referring to the fact that Lennon withdrew just before kick-off due to an illness (which he had apparently been suffering from since Sunday):

"He went out for a warm-up, I picked the team, put the team-sheet in and he came back in. We were sitting almost waiting to go out and I looked at him and he was sitting there looking like death warmed up."

The part I'm interested in is the "I picked the team" bit. I'd love to know how literally we are to take this. I can't believe any manager could prepare for a game as important as this without informing players of their individual roles etc. some days before hand. Of course, I can only guess, but Spurs didn't look like a team which had been particularly primed to counter Madrid's strengths. They were dominated the whole game, even before the second of Crouch's ridiculous lunges.

Re: the game - it takes something special to get a result against Madrid at the Bernabeu. It's almost impossible to do so with 10 men. And it's definitely impossible to do it with 10 men who haven't been prepared properly. There didn't seem be a specific plan to deal with Alonso in particular, who dominated the game very comfortably. The fact that Jenas was marking Adebayor for the first goal has already been pointed out as a big mistake, but there were other, simpler strategic oversights which aren't satisfactorily mitigated by the excuse of last-minute upheaval.

Also, it is amazing how much power Ronaldo seems to have in the Madrid team. He was, in the main, quite wasteful, and almost every Madrid attack ended at his feet. He must've been instructed to shoot at every opportunity, because he always spurned the simple pass, preferring to aim straight for glory. One (deflected) goal is not a great return for a total of 14 attempts.

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Chelsea 0 - 1 Manchester United

Ferguson will have been delighted when he saw how Chelsea had lined up. Their 4-4-2 (however "fluid") made them predictable, and never allowed them to build up sustained pressure. (It is worth noting that their best period - when they should've had at least one, maybe two penalties - was in the final 15 minutes after Malouda and Anelka had taken up wide positions).

Neither Drogba nor Torres enjoys playing as part of a front two - counterintuitively, it actually gives them far less freedom, and it makes them easier to be man marked. As a lone striker at Liverpool, Torres would distract and confuse defenders by moving across the entire back four, but ultimately ending up in a central striking position when attacking moves reached their conclusion. Since signing for Chelsea, Torres has spent too much time lurking at the far post and pulling out to the touchline in search of space.

Chelsea's fluidity was actually something of a problem in this game. Zhirkov, Ramires, Lampard and Essien are all dynamic midfielders who like to make runs, swap positions, and are comfortable defending and attacking. They really lacked a specialist holding midfielder, though, and it was a mistake not to use the substitute Mikel earlier. Chelsea never really asserted any sustained dominance until the Nigerian came on to anchor the midfield, maintaining a deep position to break up United counter attacks and direct the ball back towards their goal.

Also, you'd think it would be taken for granted now that a team fielding three central midfielders (Rooney constantly dropped deep to offer more passing angles for Carrick and Giggs) will dominate one with two. People have noted Carrick's positive performance, but, apart from the pass to Giggs for the goal, he played his usual solid, simple passing game - he just had a lot more space than usual. Despite being the away side, United dominated possession, especially in advanced positions, for most of the first half, and then were happy to sit back in the second.

It is also surprising that, once Malouda had come off and Rafael had been replaced at right back by Antonio Valencia, Chelsea didn't direct the ball down their left-wing more regularly. It seemed like they missed a trick in that sense.